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Sealing Quantum Message By Quantum Code
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(Dated: November 28, 2018)
Quantum error correcting code is a useful tool to combat noise in quantum computation. It
is also an important ingredient in a number of unconditionally secure quantum key distribution
schemes. Here, I am going to show that quantum code can also be used to seal a quantum message.
Specifically, every one can still read the content of the sealed quantum message. But, any such
attempt can be detected by an authorized verifier with an exponentially close to one probability.
PACS numbers: 03.67.Dd, 03.67.Pp, 89.20.Ff, 89.70.+c
Introduction — We sometimes put an important docu-
ment, such as a will, in an envelop sealed with molten wax
so that others can open it only by breaking the wax. The
sealed envelop, therefore, acts like a witness of whether
the document has been open.
Clearly, it is meaningful and useful to extend the con-
cept of physical wax seal to the digital world. Yet, no
digital sealing scheme is unconditionally secure in the
classical digital world as one can, in principle, copy all
the bits without being caught.
Recently, Bechmann-Pasquinucci examined the possi-
bility of sealing a classical digital signal using quantum
mechanics. Specifically, he proposed a way to represent
one bit of classical signal by three qubits out of which
one of them is erroneous. Using single qubit measure-
ment along the standard basis plus the classical [3, 1, 3]2
majority vote code, everyone can obtain the original clas-
sical bit with certainty. And at the same time, an autho-
rized verifier, who knows some extra information on the
erroneous qubit, is able to check if someone has extracted
the encoded classical bit with non-negligible probability
[1].
Nevertheless, Bechmann-Pasquinucci’s scheme is far
from a good quantum seal as there is a non-negligible
chance of knowing the original bit without being caught.1
For instance, one may randomly pick one of the qubits
and measure its state along the standard basis. In
this way, the chance of knowing the original classi-
cal bit correctly without being caught equals 2/3 +
(1/3)(1/2)(1/2) = 0.75. Furthermore, it is not clear how
to seal quantum information in Bechmann-Pasquinucci’s
scheme.
In this Letter, I report a quantum seal scheme using
quantum error correcting code. This scheme can seal
both classical and quantum signals. I also prove that
1 Actually, Bechmann-Pasquinucci was more interested in the se-
curity of obtaining the entire classical bit string by which each
bit is encoded using his scheme. However, this security require-
ment is too relaxed as the ability to know just a single bit of
an important document without being caught may already have
serious sequences.
any person other than an authorized verifier has an ex-
ponentially small chance of knowing the original signal
without being caught. This remains true even when the
person has unlimited computational power.
The Quantum Seal — Let |ψ〉 be the state of a qubit
that Alice wants to make public so that anyone may use
it. (Note that because of the no cloning theorem, Al-
ice may know nothing about the state |ψ〉.) To seal the
state, Alice publicly announces a [[n, 1, d]]2 Calderbank-
Shor-Steane (CSS) code [2, 3, 4] with d ≥ 0.11n and
uses it to encode |ψ〉. (The existence of such a code
is guaranteed by a theorem of Gottesman in Ref. [5].)
The encoded state is denoted by |ψ〉L. Alice further
chooses a [[n′, 1, 3]]2 stabilizer code and uses it to en-
code t ≡ ⌊(d− 1)/2⌋ copies of |0〉. Such an encoded state
is denoted by |0〉⊗tL′ . As depicted in Fig. 1, Alice ran-
domly selects (n− t) qubits from those used to represent
|ψ〉L and t qubits each from a separate copy of |0〉L′ . She
makes these n selected qubits publicly accessible. At the
same time, she keeps all the remaining n′t qubits (which
consist of the t qubits used to encoded |ψ〉L and the re-
maining (n′ − 1)t qubits used to encode t copies of |0〉)
in a secure place. This marks the end of the quantum
sealing phase. Clearly, the security of the quantum seal
originates from the secrecy of which of the (n−t) publicly
available qubits are used to encode |ψ〉.
To open the seal and obtain the original quantum state,
Bob simply applies the standard quantum error correc-
tion procedure for the [[n, 1, d]]2 CSS code to the n pub-
licly accessible qubits. This method works because there
are only t out of the n qubits at unknown locations that
are not used to encode |ψ〉.
To check if the seal is opened, we need an authorized
verifier who has access to the remaining n′t qubits and
knows the locations of the t publicly accessible qubits
that are not used to encode |ψ〉. Clearly, if no one has
touched the n publicly available qubits, the (n + n′t)
qubits accessible by the verifier should be in the state
|ψ〉L ⊗ |0〉
⊗t
L′ . Therefore, the verifier accepts the seal as
unbroken only if the [[n, 1, d]]2 and the [[n
′, 1, 3]]2 stabi-
lizer code error syndrome measurements reveal that all
the (n+ n′t) qubits are error-free.
Security Of The Quantum Seal — Now, I am going to
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Verifier’s LabPublicly Accessible
FIG. 1: As an example, I schematically represent the quan-
tum seal using the [[7, 1, 3]]2 CSS code and the [[5, 1, 3]]2 per-
fect code in this figure. Each dot represents a qubit and the
solid line joining the dots represents the entangled qubits in
[[7, 1, 3]]2 or [5, 1, 3]]2 code. Qubits in the left dashed box are
publicly accessible while those in the right dashed box are
available only to an authorized verifier.
show that the above quantum sealing scheme is uncondi-
tionally secure. Specifically, for any security parameters
(ǫp, ǫI) , there exists a quantum sealing scheme using a
sufficiently long quantum codeword length n such that
whenever Bob (who is not an verifier) applies a cheating
strategy whose probability of success is at least ǫp, his in-
formation on the state |ψ〉 is less than ǫI . Moreover, this
is true even if he has unlimited computational power.
I prove the unconditional security of the above scheme
by reduction. First, I consider a revised quantum sealing
scheme and show that it is as secure as the original one
introduced above. The encoding procedure of the revised
scheme is the same as the original one. But in the verifi-
cation procedure of the revised scheme, the verifier also
measures the encoded spin flip operator for the [[n, 1, d]]2
and the [[n′, 1, 3]]2 stabilizer codes in addition to the er-
ror syndrome measurement. Yet, the verifier accepts the
quantum seal as unbroken based only on the result of the
error syndrome measurement in exactly the same way as
in the original scheme. Note that the encoded spin flip
operations commute with the stabilizer and the accep-
tance criterion of the revised scheme does not depend on
the result of the encoded spin flip measurement. Conse-
quently, any cheating strategy will have an equal chance
to pass through the verification test and will reveal an
equal amount of information on the sealed quantum state
when applied to the original and the revised schemes. In
this respect, the two schemes are equally secure; and it
suffices to prove the security of the revised scheme.
Second, I reduce every quantum cheating strategy for
the revised scheme to a corresponding classical cheat-
ing strategy. Observe that there are (n + n′t) indepen-
dent stabilizers and encoded spin flip operations, all the
(n+ n′t) qubits are measured in the revised scheme dur-
ing the verification phase. Hence, following the argument
of Lo and Chau in Ref. [6], any quantum cheating strat-
egy for the revised scheme can be reduced to a classical
probabilistic one. More precisely, all cheating strategies
can be generated by the classical deterministic strategies⊗n
i=1 si acting on the n qubits accessible by Bob, where
si ∈ {I, σx, σy , σz}.
Third, I analyze what type of classical cheating strat-
egy reveals the information on the locations of the t pub-
licly accessible qubits that are not used to encode the
sealed state |ψ〉. As the t qubits taken from |0〉⊗tL′ are
unentangled with the (n − t) qubits taken from |ψ〉L,
the entropy and hence the information obtained from the
measurement of those qubits coming from |ψ〉L and |0〉
⊗t
L′
using any classical strategy are independent. Since the
code [[n, 1, d]]2 used is publicly known and all the qubits
used to encode |ψ〉 do not suffer from any quantum er-
ror, any measurement of the (n − t) publicly available
qubits taken from |ψ〉L only reveals information on the
sealed quantum state |ψ〉. Similarly, any measurement of
the t qubits taken from |0〉⊗tL′ only reveals information on
the location and the nature of the “quantum error” by
regarding the n publicly available qubits as a [[n, 1, d]]2
codeword.
Fourth, I show that the verification test put a strin-
gent limit on the information obtained by any classical
cheating strategy. Recall that only one qubit for each
[[n′, 1, 3]]2 encoded |0〉 are publicly accessible. Conse-
quently, amongst the deterministic cheating strategies⊗n
i=1 si, only those that cause no error in all the t qubits
taken from |0〉⊗tL′ can pass the verification test. So, in or-
der to have at least ǫp chance of passing the verification
test, Bob cannot put too much weight on those cheating
strategies that cause error in these t qubits. Similarly,
only those errors in the (n − t) qubits taken from |ψ〉L
that commute with the stabilizer of [[n, 1, d]]2 can pass
the test. Recall that operations commuting with the sta-
bilizer of [[n, 1, d]]2 are generated by the stabilizer and
the encoded operations. Besides, an error in the stabi-
lizer of a code simply permutes the stabilizer itself [7].
Therefore, effectively the types of action on |ψ〉L that
can pass the verification test are those generated by the
encoded operations of [[n, 1, d]]2.
By the Holevo theorem [8], Bob’s information Ie on
the locations of the t publicly accessible qubits that are
not used to encode |ψ〉 is upper bounded by the entropy
of the reduced density matrix of the n′t qubits originally
used to encode |0〉⊗t. Therefore, Ie is upper bounded by
the entropy of the reduced density matrix diag[a, (1 −
a)/(2t−1), (1−a)/(2t−1), . . . , (1−a)/(2t−1)]. In other
words,
Ie ≤ −a log2 a− (1− a) log2[(1 − a)/(2
t − 1)]
< H(a) + t(1− a), (1)
where H(a) ≡ −a log2 a − (1 − a) log2(1 − a) and a is
the probability of choosing a deterministic strategy that
causes no error in all the t qubits taken from |0〉⊗tL′ .
If the strategy passes the verification test with proba-
bility at least ǫp, we demand ǫp ≤ a ≤ 1. Provided that
3Alice chooses a sufficiently long code [[n, 1, d]]2 in such a
way that t ≡ ⌊(d− 1)/2⌋ satisfies
ǫp > 1/(1 + 2
t), (2)
Bob’s information on the locations of those t qubits in
Eq. (1) is upper bounded by
Ie < H(ǫp) + (1 − ǫp)t ≡ Ibound(ǫp). (3)
Consequently, for any cheating strategy that passes the
verification test with probability at least ǫp, the loca-
tions of at most Ibound(ǫp) of out the t publicly accessible
qubits taken from |0〉⊗tL′ are known to Bob.
Finally, I am ready to bound the amount of informa-
tion on the sealed quantum state revealed by a cheating
strategy that passes through the verification test with
probability at least ǫp. But before I do so, let me sum-
marize the situation after Bob passes the verification test.
Bob knows the locations of at most Ibound(ǫp) out of the
n publicly accessible qubits that are not used to encode
|ψ〉. Denote ρ the covering radius of the [[n, 1, d]]2 quan-
tum code. That is to say, ρ is the smallest integer such
that Fn4 equals the union of spheres of radius ρ centered
at the vectors spanned by the stabilizers and encoded
operations of the [[n, 1, d]]2 CSS code over F4. In simple
terms, ρ is nothing but the maximum number of errors
the quantum code [[n, 1, d]]2 can handle. Thus, in or-
der to recover the sealed quantum state |ψ〉, Bob has to
determine the locations of at least (n− ρ) out of the re-
maining [n − Ibound(ǫp)] qubits that are used to encode
|ψ〉. More importantly, he has to do so in the presence of
at least [t− Ibound(ǫp)] qubits chosen from |0〉
⊗t
L′ without
affecting them.
Since the locations of these [t − Ibound(ǫp)] qubits are
unknown to Bob, this problem is equivalent to picking
(n− ρ) good balls out of an urn of [n− Ibound(ǫp)] balls
with [t− Ibound(ǫp)] of them being bad. The probability
of correctly picking the good balls is given by
p =
n−ρ−1∏
i=0
(n− t− i)
[n− Ibound(ǫp)− i]
≤
[
n− t
n− Ibound(ǫp)
]n−ρ
. (4)
The [[n, 1, d]]2 CSS code can be regarded as a classical
(n, ⌈[n+ 1]/2⌉) code over F4 [4, 7]. Applying the redun-
dancy bound [9] to this classical code, I conclude that
ρ ≤ n−
⌈
n+ 1
2
⌉
=
⌊
n− 1
2
⌋
. (5)
Recall that Bob may obtain some information on |ψ〉
only when he makes use of at least (n − ρ) out of the
n publicly accessible qubits. Therefore, from Eqs. (4)
and (5), Bob’s information I|ψ〉 on |ψ〉 is upper bounded
by
I|ψ〉 ≤
[
n− t
n− Ibound(ǫp)
]⌈(n+1)/2⌉
. (6)
Remember that one can always choose t/n to be at
least 0.5H−1(1/2) ≈ 0.055 [5]. Besides, Eq. (3) im-
plies that Ibound(ǫp) increases linearly with t. Since
Ibound(ǫp) < t whenever Eq. (2) holds, I conclude that
(n − t)/[n − Ibound(ǫp)] is upper bounded by a positive
number α(ǫp) < 1 for sufficiently large n. More im-
portantly, α(ǫp) is independent of n. (Actually, α(0) ≤
(1− 0.055)/(1+0.055)< 0.896.) Therefore, by choosing
n ≥ 2 logα(ǫp)
(
1
ǫI
)
, (7)
Bob’s information on the sealed quantum state |ψ〉 is less
than ǫI .
In conclusion, I show that for any security parameters
(ǫp, ǫI), there is an unconditionally secure quantum seal
with n satisfying Eqs. (2) and (7) such that whenever Bob
uses a cheating strategy that passes with probability at
least ǫp, his information on the sealed quantum state |ψ〉
is less than ǫI .
Discussions — Three remarks are in place. First, al-
though I focus the discussion on sealing a pure quantum
state, the analysis above applies equally well to mixed
state. Hence, the quantum sealing scheme reported here
is also valid for sealing mixed state.
Second, since the verification test is nothing but an
error syndrome measurement procedure, the quantum
sealing scheme works equally well if the encoded state
|0〉⊗tL′ is replaced by
⊗t
i=1 |φi〉L′ for some pure states |φi〉
(i = 1, 2, . . . , t).
Third, all versions of quantum sealing schemes intro-
duced in the Letter uses two stabilizer codes. It is more
efficient to seal a quantum state by using just one stabi-
lizer code. That is to say, one encodes the quantum state
to be sealed by a [[n, 1, d]]2 code and randomly replace
t ≡ ⌊(d− 1)/2⌋ qubits in the codeword by some randomly
chosen pure states similar to the Bechmann-Pasquinucci
scheme [1]. It is instructive to investigate the uncondi-
tional security of this scheme by suitably bounding the
information on the locations of the t replaced qubits.
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